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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY ) 
COMPANY, a Maryland Corporation, ) 
and SHELL OIL COMPANY, a ) 
Civil No. 17099 
Delaware corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants and Respondents. 
LaMAR D. STEVENSON d/b/a LaMAR 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH and THE UTAH 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
) 
D.) 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
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) 
) 
) 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HIGHLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
' 
) 
~ 
) 
) 
) 
) 
LaMAR D. STEVENSON d/b/a LaMAR ) 
D. CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, UNITED ) 
STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY ) 
COMPANY, a Maryland Corporation, ) 
and SHELL OIL COMPANY, a ) 
Delaware corporation, ) 
Defendants and Respondents. 
) 
) 
LaMAR D. STEVENSON d/b/a LaMAR D.) 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH and THE UTAH 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Civil No. 17099 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR PARTIAL REHEARING 
Respondents, LaMar D. Stevenson (hereinafter referred to 
as "Stevenson" or "petitioner") and United States Fidelity and 
Guarantee Company (hereinafter ref erred to as "USF&G" or 
"petitioner") hereby submit the following brief in support of 
their petition for partial rehearing: 
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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Petitioners concur in the statement of nature of case 
previously set forth in the briefs filed in this action. 
DISPOSITION IN DISTRICT COURT 
Petitioners concur in the statement of the disposition 
in the district court previously set forth in the briefs in this 
case. 
RELIEF ON SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petitioners petition the Court to set aside the portion 
of its judgment on appeal awarding attorney's fees in favor of 
Highland against Stevenson. Petitioners further petition the 
Court to allow (either by remand to the trial court or by pro-
viding for the supplementation of the record on appeal) for full 
consideration of the facts relating to the issue of whether, 
under the law as set forth in this Court's decision in this case, 
Highland is entitled to be awarded attorney's fees against 
Stevenson. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this Court's decision filed in this case on August 
28, 1981, this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court 
rendered in favor of petitioners and against Highland. However, 
in spite of such affirmance, this Court went on to award 
attorney's fees (in an amount to be determined by the trial 
court) against Stevenson in favor of Highland. The award was 
- 2 -
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based on both legal and factual findings by this Court. The 
legal determination was that a general contractor, who admits 
that a sum is owing but wrongfully refuses to make payment of 
such sum until after suit is filed against him, may be held 
liable for attorney's fees incurred up to. the time of payment 
under UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 14-1-8. The factual determinations 
were that in the instant case Stevenson did owe Highland $10,378, 
that he admitted owing such sum, and that he wrongfully withheld 
payment until 164 days after suit was filed. 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioners acknowledge and recognize this Court has the 
supreme judicial authority in this state possessing the authority 
and right to make the ultimate interpretation of the laws of this 
state. On legal issues this Court has the final and ultimate 
word and petitioners do not seek, by this petition, to challenge 
that well-established principle. Accordingly, even though pet i -
tioners may not agree with this Court's interpretation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. 1953 § 14-1-8 providing that a contractor who admits 
that a sum is owing but wrongfully refuses to make payment of 
such sum until after suit is filed against him may be held liable 
for attorney's fees up to the time of payment, it recognizes this 
Court's ultimate authority to make that determination of law. By 
this petition, petitioners do not challenge this Court's findings 
on the law or seek rehearing of the legal issues. Petitioners 
accept and consider themselves bound by the announcement of law 
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as set forth in the decision. 
However, this Court, in its decision, not only announced 
the aforesaid principle of law, but also made the factual deter-
mination that the facts of the instant case brought it within the 
announced principle of law. It is generally not this Court's 
role to make factual determinations and, in the instant case, the 
factual findings made by this Court were made in error and will 
work a substantial injustice and a denial of due process of law 
if not corrected. 
POINT I. THE COURT WAS MISLED AS TO THE RELEVANT FACTS AND ITS 
FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS ARE IN ERROR. 
On page 6 of its decision, the Court made the following 
express factual determinations: 
A. That Stevenson admitted that he owed and voluntarily 
paid Highland $10,300.78. 
B. That such payment was not made until 164 days after 
the action was filed. 
Essential to the Court's decision on this issue were 
also the following implicit factual determinations: 
C. That the amount paid was in fact legally owing by 
Stevenson to Highland. 
D. That it was owing for the entire 164 days. 
E. That no prior tender of an equivalent or greater 
amount had previously been made by Stevenson to Highland. 
If supplementation of the record is allowed as set forth 
in petitioners' Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal filed 
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herewith, or if the case is remanded and an evidentiary hearing 
is conducted by the court below, it will be demonstrated that the 
foregoing express and implicit findings of fact are in error. 
Because Highland did not pursue the issue of attorney's 
fees in the trial court, the supporting and countering evidence 
on that issue has never been presented and is not in the record 
sent up on appeal. (Since it was Highland's claim, petitioners 
did not consider it their obligation to present countering evi-
dence on the issue, when Highland did not even attempt to pursue 
it in the court below.) Recognizing the well-established rule 
that it is improper to argue facts on appeal which are not con-
tained in the record, petitioners made no attempt to present the 
countering evidence by way of responding brief when Highland 
raised the issue for the first time on appeal. Petitioners 
simply relied (justifiably) on the rule that matters not pre-
sented below would not be considered by this Court. (See p. 40 
of Respondents' Brief.) Petitioners considered themselves bound 
by the time-honored rule and believed, in good faith, that the 
Court would also consider Highland to be so bound. 
Apparently, this Court drew an inference from 
petitioners' failure to argue countering facts that petitioners 
did not contest the assertions made by Highland in their brief 
and that the facts set forth above were true. The net result of 
this situation and the decision of appeal is to penalize peti-
tioners for having acted properly in following the rule, while 
rewarding Highland for disregarding it. Such a result seems to 
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be clearly contrary to sound judicial policy. It will encourage 
parties to raise matters on appeal which were not raised below 
and will force responding parties to respond on the merits of the 
new issues raised. If the portion of the instant decision in 
inviting the raising of new issues on appeal (something which it 
has long forbidden) and will be encouraging the cluttering of 
appellant briefs with matters extraneous to the record. 
Al though petitioners recognize the impropriety of 
arguing facts not in the record, they are, as a result of the 
decision in this case, now forced to do so. Accordingly, peti-
tioners respectfully submit that if they are allowed the oppor-
tunity to present the facts relevant to the issue in question, 
such facts will demonstrate: 
A. That on December 30, 1976, before any legal action 
was taken by Highland, Stevenson tendered the sum of $10,610.80 
to Highland. That tender was made way of a letter and a check 
(attached as Exhibit A to petitioners' Motion to Supplement the 
Record on Appeal). 
B. Highland rejected the tender of $10,610.80 and 
demanded $68,757.73. 
C. As a condition to Highland's being entitled to 
payment from Stevenson, it was required to supply lien waivers 
and to provide a detailed itemized breakdown of its claims as 
required by the contract documents. Al though Highland did sub-
sequently supply lien waivers, it refused to provide the contrac-
tually required breakdown and itemization. (See Exhibits B and C 
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be clearly contrary to sound judicial _policy. It will encourage 
parties to raise. matters on appeal which were not raised below 
and will force responding parties to respond on the merits of the· 
new issues raised. If the portion of the instant decision in 
• 
question is allowed to stand unmodified, this Court will be 
inviting the raising of new issues on appeal (something which it 
has long forbidden) and will be encouraging the cluttering of 
appellant briefs with matters extraneous to the record. 
Although petitioners recognize the impropriety of 
arguing facts not in the record, they are, as a result of the 
decision in this case, now forced to do so. Accordingly, peti-
tioners respectfully submit that if they are allowed the oppor-
tunity to present the facts relevant to the issue in question, 
such facts will demonstrate: 
A. That on December 30, 19~6, before any legal action 
was taken by Highland, Stevenson tendered the sum of $10,610.80 
to Highland. That tender was made by way of a letter and a check 
(attached as Exhibit A to petitioners' Motion to Supplement the 
Record on Appeal). 
B. Highland rejected the tender of $10,610.80 and 
demanded $68,757.73. 
c. As a condition to Highland's being entitled to 
payment from Stevenson, it was required to supply lien waivers 
and to provide a detailed itemized breakdown of its claims as 
required by the contract documents. Although Highland did sub-
sequently supply lien waivers, it refused to provide the contrac-
tually required breakdown and itemization. (See Exhibits B and c 
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to Petitioners' Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal.) 
D. That based on the agreement between the parties, 
Stevenson was not required to make payments to Highland until the 
Department of Transportation made payments to him for work per-
formed by Highland. As the Department of Transportation made 
progress payments to Stevenson, Stevenson promptly made payment 
to Highland of the amounts owing to Highland reflected in such 
progress payments. 
E. The voluntary p~yment made by Stevenson to Highland 
on December 19, 1977, of $10, 300. 78 did not reflect amounts due 
to Highland prior to that time, but was made because the 
Department of Transportation had made a payment to Stevenson of 
$11,328.67 on December 1, 1977. The cover letter sent with that 
payment and a subsequent letter between counsel, make it expli-
citly clear that the payment was not made as an admission of 
liability. (See Exhibits D, E and F attached to Petitioners' 
Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal.) Both petitioners' 
counsel, Roger P. Christensen, and Bruce Maak, who was counsel 
for Highland for the period in question, will testify that it was 
expressly understood that such payment was in no way to be 
construed as an admission of liability by Stevenson. 
F. The facts will also demonstrate that the amounts 
reflected in the $10,300~78 payment were not, in fact, owing by 
Stevenson to Highland. The trial court ultimately found that 
Highland's claims were without merit. Based on this ultimate 
determination of the dispute, such sums should never have been 
- 7 -
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paid by Stevenson to Highland. 
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted 
that this Court was misled as to the actual facts (which unfor-
tunate occurrence was made possible by the lack of evidence in 
the record), that its factual finding are in error, that such 
findings should be set aside and decision on that issue should be 
made only after petitioners are afforded a full and fair oppor-
tunity to present and be heard on the relevant facts. 
POINT II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED, UNDER THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSES OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS, TO A FULL AND 
~AIR EVIDENtIARY HEARING. 
The fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution and section 7 of article I of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah both provide that no person shall be deprived 
of property without due process of law. This Court has long 
recognized that it is fundamental to due process to allow a party 
an opportunity to be heard on the relevant facts before a factual 
judgment is made. In the case of Christiansen v. Harris, 163 
P.2d 314 (Utah 1945), this principle was stated as follows: 
Many attempts have been made to further define 
"due process" but they all resolve into the 
thought that a party shall have his day in 
court--that is each party shall have the right 
to a hearing before a competent court, with 
the privilege of being heard and introducing 
evidence to establish his cause or his 
defense, after which comes judgment upon the 
record thus made. 
Id. at 316. 
In Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), this 
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Court stated, "Irnplici t in the due process clause of our state 
Constitution is that persons be afforded a hearing to determine 
their rights under the law." Id. at 867. 
-
Due to the fact that the issue of Stevenson's liability 
for attorney's fees was not pursued below, an evidentiary hearing 
on that issue has not been conducted. As stated above, peti-
tioners have a constitutional right to have such a hearing and it 
is respectually submitted that the opportunity for such a hearing 
should be afforded either in this Court or in the court below 
before a judgment on Stevenson's liability is made. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectually submitted 
that the portion of this Court's decision granting judgment in 
favor of Highland and against Stevenson for attorney's fees be 
set aside and the parties allowed an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether, under the facts of this case and the appli-
cable law as set forth in the Court's decision, Stevenson is 
liable to Highland for such fees. 
DATED this 17th day of September, 1981. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
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